One thing Mojtaba is not is a religious scholar, fit to lead a country whose founding revolutionary purpose was to place the state under the total authority of the most distinguished Shiite jurist. His father came up short on this score too—but not as short as Mojtaba. Upon appointment, Ali was a hojjat al-Islam, a journeyman jurist, one grade below ayatollah. (In elevating Ali, the Assembly of Experts passed over Hussein-Ali Montazeri, a grand ayatollah, whose scholarly chops eclipsed Khamenei’s but who had recently fallen out with the regime.) Mojtaba has studied religion but is not even a hojjat al-Islam. The typical currency of clerical power is the number of people who freely choose to follow your guidance when you deliver rulings on what Islam commands, whether in personal matters or political ones. Very few deferred to Ali Khamenei in matters of Islamic law when he was elevated, and no one at all cares what his son has to say on these issues. Many fear Mojtaba, but they fear his secular clout. In U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks, Iranian sources complained even 18 years ago that Mojtaba had grown too strong and was running his father’s office. (They also claimed that he traveled repeatedly to London for impotency treatment.)